Comments on: Two Thoughts on Copyright Reform http://ipinthedigitalage.com/working-title/ CPSC 182 at Yale College Mon, 18 May 2009 01:26:09 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0 By: Matt D http://ipinthedigitalage.com/working-title/comment-page-1/#comment-1929 Matt D Sun, 17 May 2009 15:37:26 +0000 http://ipinthedigitalage.com/?p=586#comment-1929 Thanks very much for the clarifications! Sorry I wasn't able to delve into your specific points in the post--my typing speed is subpar, especially while eating lunch at the same time. I haven't really considered the dangers of over-regulating in this space, since the reality today is so divorced from that concept. Are there any other examples of prominent copyright regimes that imposed too much of a regulatory burden? Thanks very much for the clarifications! Sorry I wasn’t able to delve into your specific points in the post–my typing speed is subpar, especially while eating lunch at the same time.

I haven’t really considered the dangers of over-regulating in this space, since the reality today is so divorced from that concept. Are there any other examples of prominent copyright regimes that imposed too much of a regulatory burden?

]]> By: William Patry http://ipinthedigitalage.com/working-title/comment-page-1/#comment-1909 William Patry Wed, 06 May 2009 11:13:20 +0000 http://ipinthedigitalage.com/?p=586#comment-1909 Hi Brian, thanks for writing this up. The purpose of the talk was to show the dangers from NOT regulating. There are always dangers in over-regulating, for example a regime where there is a government board to which one could appeal licensing fees. The British had such a board in their 1710 Statute of Anne; it was later abandoned. Our 1790 Act, while copying much of the Statute of Anne, did not copy that feature. At the same time, under our many current compulsory licenses, the are fees set by: a government board (three administrative judges). That system has never worked well, yet is necessary in some form because transactional costs are too high given the number of licensees (in some cases) or licensors (in others) or both. As for specifics of reform, again the purpose of the talk was to provide a framework by which one could craft reforms, but here are a few specifics: (1) protect only those works that require the incentive of copyright; private letters and works of architecture don't, for example; (2) a term of protection that is fitted for the incentive needed but no more than a 28 year original term, coupled with (3) a renewal term of another 28 years provided renewal is made; (4) a mandatory notice requirement, with provisions for inadvertent omission patterned after the 1976 Act as passed; (5) personal copying rights; (6) exceptions on the derivative right to take into account remixes, etc.; (7) a provision that focuses on the end result of an online use, like snippets and which does not focus on the back end; (8) abolition of chapter 12 of title 17 (DRMs). That's a start. Hi Brian, thanks for writing this up. The purpose of the talk was to show the dangers from NOT regulating. There are always dangers in over-regulating, for example a regime where there is a government board to which one could appeal licensing fees. The British had such a board in their 1710 Statute of Anne; it was later abandoned. Our 1790 Act, while copying much of the Statute of Anne, did not copy that feature. At the same time, under our many current compulsory licenses, the are fees set by: a government board (three administrative judges). That system has never worked well, yet is necessary in some form because transactional costs are too high given the number of licensees (in some cases) or licensors (in others) or both.
As for specifics of reform, again the purpose of the talk was to provide a framework by which one could craft reforms, but here are a few specifics: (1) protect only those works that require the incentive of copyright; private letters and works of architecture don’t, for example; (2) a term of protection that is fitted for the incentive needed but no more than a 28 year original term, coupled with (3) a renewal term of another 28 years provided renewal is made; (4) a mandatory notice requirement, with provisions for inadvertent omission patterned after the 1976 Act as passed; (5) personal copying rights; (6) exceptions on the derivative right to take into account remixes, etc.; (7) a provision that focuses on the end result of an online use, like snippets and which does not focus on the back end; (8) abolition of chapter 12 of title 17 (DRMs). That’s a start.

]]> By: Brian L http://ipinthedigitalage.com/working-title/comment-page-1/#comment-1608 Brian L Wed, 22 Apr 2009 18:06:00 +0000 http://ipinthedigitalage.com/?p=586#comment-1608 Great post! I think your point that ¨copyright is purely a creation of the legislature" is right on and speaks to the deeper reasons why the success of copyright law of attaining its Constitutional goal of promoting "science and the arts" is not examined. As we have discussed in the seminar, the legislature is highly influenced by lobbyists and interest groups, that finance campaigns and have historically wined and dined Senators and Congressmen to buy influence. Perhaps we could even consider campaign finance reform to be part of the solution to overhauling copyright law; if legislators have no incentive to extend copyright law or act in the best interest of large corporate copyright owners, I would imagine that the trend of lengthening copyright protetion would promptly end. Great post! I think your point that ¨copyright is purely a creation of the legislature” is right on and speaks to the deeper reasons why the success of copyright law of attaining its Constitutional goal of promoting “science and the arts” is not examined. As we have discussed in the seminar, the legislature is highly influenced by lobbyists and interest groups, that finance campaigns and have historically wined and dined Senators and Congressmen to buy influence. Perhaps we could even consider campaign finance reform to be part of the solution to overhauling copyright law; if legislators have no incentive to extend copyright law or act in the best interest of large corporate copyright owners, I would imagine that the trend of lengthening copyright protetion would promptly end.

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